Nice Hand

I’m wary of sharing too much non-basic strat in the forums. It’s overkill. First of all, most of these guys don’t really even require it to beat low stakes poker. Second, with all the time I put into finding and creating it, I don’t need to pass it on like some sort of poker NGOer laboring in Tournadonkistan. Third, I don’t want the games to be harder than they are. What I do like to do is pick out spots here and there that are worth discussing because of an important concept or an issue worth debating, or most commonly, where a novice needs some fundamental help. I give so that I can receive; I don’t want you actually following my advice because that is not good for me. However, for the dedicated reader who travels all the way through the wild and bully click jungle to this site, which doesn’t even come up on a reasonable search for poker blogs and has the relative SEO power of outcast high stakes gamer and now professional virtue-signaller Haseeb Qureshi, who feels the need to assure you that he “wrote all this stuff,” I will go the extra mile. Welcome to the temple, Indy.

Faithful poster Skors recently posted a hand so well played I was ready to shed a tear. A few things can be said about it.

First off, I like the hand history itself. We get critical information, rather than the usual ipecac self-praise that pimples hand descriptions (“I’ve been running over the table and now sitting deep with 150 bbs…” “Several fish and one guy who is decent and respects my game and I respect his game and we respect each other’s games…”):

Lots of limping and limp calling. Players have turned over some bad hands.

So we know the game is getting loose passive preflop. This is a common development in a low stakes poker game, and in fact, in almost all games. We start carefully, then relax – into what, is always the question. We want to counter this particular loose-passive development as soon as possible by attacking weak ranges and eating up equity that tighter games will not spill onto our plate. (We can neither confirm nor deny that they will continue to play like this postflop, however.)

Then we get game flow information specific to the OP:

However I started picking up some hands and was raising a lot in the last couple orbits.

The table knows we are picking up steam. Therefore, unless we are playing cards at a local meeting of Remaining Men Together, someone wants, and will try, to pick us off. We know our image, and they know it, too. Once this is established, the battlefront is set, because we are on the same field, that is to say, in pokerese, the same level. This hand will rarely play out this way in the first few orbits of the game, where no one knows what’s what. It’s our job as non-fish to know this.

From the small blind, Skors attempts to pull aside a weak member from a herd of limpers with QdQs, and succeeds. Villain calls from LP with what must be a very speculative hand, as the squeeze was open to him, too.

FLOP ~$120 Td9s6d

Skors immediately recognizes something important about this board:

With 2 diamonds and a semi-coordinated flop this board rates to hit Villain more than me.

So then, how do we approach this situation? Fortunately, we are given a foil for our argument from enthusiastic poster Kagey, who stands in for the regs at the table.

if the pot is 120 on the flop, I’d have bet 100-110.

Kagey makes the reasonable deduction that he is ahead. Fair enough, but he does not notice what the board is telling him; he is not examining the field of battle. He’s thinking about the very real but very one dimensional concept of equities as opposed to the sequences of actions which comprise a poker hand. He is not looking in every direction. He is the guy who heads out into the arterial simply because there is a crosswalk in front of him.

Despite his reasonable injunction,

Good to great players are looking to get the most out of their premium hands – so they take betting lines that extract the maximum without risking their stack.

he contradicts himself as soon as he proposes his plan for this spot. By polarizing his perceived range vis-a-vis the board which does not rate to hit him, he is folding out most everything (similar to what he thinks the effect of Skors’ eventual action will do) he directly beats, setting himself up to capture one bet maximum from those he does, while also incentivizing draws – the hands he actually should fear the most – to continue at their leisure. See the difference between a bet and a check raise? Drawing hands, on a drawing board, natch, can call in position assured they are getting better than 2:1, leaving one bet to capture for profitability or to set up a steal because of all the room remaining to play. Betting pitches into the caller’s wheelhouse.

Further, Kagey’s bet, supposing for a moment it is his normal cbet, is so large he can be shoved on profitably because the board does not hit him. He burns up big blinds with all his low pairs and ace highs, which comprise more combinations than his overpairs and sets; attempting to balance the error is whack-a-mole. Most average players will not, in fact, raise him, preferring to simply take it away on the turn, for value or a bluff, but all that’s just potatoe-potato.  By blindly walking out into traffic while focused only on the inviting white paint, he sees and hears nothing, and is easily sent to the hospital on the flop or the morgue on the turn.

What “good to great players” actually do is consider their entire range, what it looks like, and what parts of it would do. Let’s put Kagey (nothing against him, seems like a guy with a lot to add) on the spot. Would he pot this flop with AK/AQ? No. A pair of sevens? No. His blocker squeezes? Maybe for a one and done. Top set? Probably not… think about his reasoning for potting it. His range is crumbling apart like the blue cheese on your poker discount mealy iceberg lettuce salad. We can now see absolutely clearly how folding to him when he pots it is entirely profitable, and continuing with all our heavy value and draws is also profitable. When he checks flop, we know we have him because he has no good checking range, because he’s busy thinking “good” players blast away with their value hands. When he checks turn, his hand strength also plummets. Over the long term, his strategy reduces his win rate in soft games and kills his potential to play in tough games because of the folds it earns or the value it misses or the money it burns up with air.

But, wait you scream, BACK UP! He has QUEENS! Q and Q! So can Skors just bet? Players love to bet! I have a hand, so I bet! That’s poker, right? Get hand and bet bet bet! Little Caesar Poker! Value Value!

Well, if the board favors the caller, why would you ever put a chip in with your perceived range that misses it? How do you protect your range? How are you ever playing anything but face up? Essentially, what Kagey proposes is an imbalance so large it is unstrategic.

I get it, though. It’s okay. The value focused exploit play. The meh play. The 1/2 play. The equity bingo play.

It is, above all, the approved Reg™ play. There is no reciprocal advantage to it, either in the short term or the long term. Everyone else will do it, and we trade chips with each other while someone clever collects rake.

Kagey and the Regs have more hands that miss this board, yet they want to beat that value drum and strum that overpair guitar every f’ing time. They want to crunch out a meaty power chord value blast and let everything else go to hell. BUHWONG!!! Maybe sometimes they’ll burn up chips with air cbets (BUHRIP!) or surrender (BUHWAHWAHWAHWAH.), we don’t know. Maybe they’ll go on a multistreet spew with a pair of fours or AK. Anything’s possible if we don’t care about the board and our opponent’s range. What we do know is Kagey has the nerve to say:

I’m not too fond of your thought process – because if feels like it’s all over the place.

Despite what the Godfather told us, the one thing we really know from history is that we never want irony against us. The Reg™ approach would leave Skors completely out of whack, his range scattered and broken. Admittedly, Regthink will definitely get you a few bucks – otherwise, why would they all play this way and pat themselves on the back for stacking novices? However, in the end, unless you take their process to the extreme by being a sick combo counter and relentless value hound like Bart Hanson or his unknown apprentice Gargamel (still exposing yourself for exploitation), you do not have a coherent strategy.

Another thing that good poker players actually do is: predict the future. What I mean by this is that they consider the nature of the board and how the runout will work with their hand. They then play in synchronicity with it, and all the variables of the hand: stack sizes, positions, equities, behaviors. Synchronicity is The Magic. It is Distillation of Shark’s Blood. It is the last drag of your GTO and poker study supply after you burn the books to roll a final cigarette, down in the trenches and ordered to head into no man’s land.

Here is an example of synchronicity, using the sedate language of ranges and expected actions, explained by a legendary expert.


That one is amazing. Galfond plays his hand exactly as he would much of his four betting range on each street and gets the desired max value, yet it never involves the idea of pot/pot/pot, the equivalent of the Reg’s approach to the game and the fallacious concept of good players always mashing their value hands. Imagine how your average PLO player approaches this spot at your local 5/5 game, and how tilted he is when he doesn’t get action or shuts down on the board pair. (Actually, many are so broken by their poor, standard play after a while, they barely even expect action, because they have no bluffs or deceptive lines, and are just glad to win the pot. Sad!)

No Planning, No Strat, Just Value, Baby: The Reg™.

So to play in synchronicity in a spot where you don’t want to proceed with your Reg™ bet-until-they-shoot-you-in-the-head line, what we want here is a value checking range, because that’s what keeps our possible holdings theoretically intact. Yes. Out of position, we need to have hands that can check – but without the intention of folding. That’s just one part of the puzzle. I’m not sorry it’s complicated; if you are getting the TLDR tingles right now, please buzz off, you’re not needed here. Also, be sure to go pleasure yourself with a cheese grater for not being able to read consecutive paragraphs.

Now we have to look at it from the position of the limp caller. Skors has squeezed to a large sizing and checked a caller’s board: that makes sense. He has more misses than hits in his perceived range. He is unlikely to be slowplaying anything. On account of these simple deductions, the caller will be incentivized to bet his equity (and he will in fact do so, like clockwork). The caller has hands to protect (both big and small): strong draws, weak draws and air. He will think that he can take this down or bet for value. It’s his board, and even from game theory perspective where the squeezer is checking both value and air, knocking back draws is troublesome- he can’t just let Ace high or sevens win at showdown.  He has a delayed cbet to worry about, and he can make a mistake by not betting the flop.

His spot wants to bet this board. He backed into this situation and most interestingly, it’s really close to what he wanted to happen. (Look at the clustering of hands that take a small piece of this board in a reasonable calling range here.) He’s not wrong, in other words.

Thus, he will do so some high percentage of the time. Now Skors is faced with how to play his own range. Yes, he will have some x/f hands here – that would, in fact, be optimal: hands like small pairs and hopeless Ax blocker squeezes. He has some x/c hands here, such as some pairs and weaker draws that don’t want to be raised; that would make sense, too. Notice what villain’s range is: because of his limp call, he ends up with a handful of draws and mid-equity hands. Our squeezing range still dominates this range at this point. Skors stated this succinctly in his explanation. We can now raise and put max pressure and go for value against all pair + gutters and other draws, whether we happen to have AK or QQ; our actual hand is partially irrelevant. We have induced a bet from a wide range and now capitalize on having played our range in synchronicity with the board. In this hand history, we simply happen to have value. I’d like to see a good frequency of the x/r with nut draws, pairs, sets, and some percentage of AK/AQ here.

I’d also like to see a slightly bigger raise, but that’s trivial.

Shocked into to his senses by the unusual line, Kagey does get cagey in objecting to this action:

What would you have done if he 4-bet you all in on the flop?

Here we must play poker, and go back to the very start. Remember we are playing in a loose passive game. Our villain is not going to come over the top without the nuts- he’s not that good, frankly. He limp called a giant raise and we have no intelligence suggesting he does this in a balanced way – we can guess his preflop range was dense with playable marginalia, suited connectors and gappers, decent suited Ax, small pairs. He had the same isolating opportunity we did. So when facing the four bet, which has few sets and two pairs (see below), we can get away from nits or make a read and go with it. Just as we made an evaluation on the flop as to what his range is, we do it again.

Skors gets a little shaky here, planning on just folding to renewed aggression, a little ashamed of his bold play. I would not advise just snap folding. We should have a raise/gii range if this is the right guy, I advise going with this hand in general: it’s simply now the bottom of our range for that action. Our villain is probably not the right guy, however, for the get-it-in line in this hand. This, however, points to the power of fast playing draws in big pots with significant money behind; were I Villain, I would not bet my nut draws without the intention of reraising all in and fighting back against the x/r. Now I get Skors to fold when he is ahead. I have several blog posts which highlight bet/three betting, an underrated aspect of the game and a strong counter to the usual pot-control, wait-until-I-know-better schtick that defines Regthink.

The turn brings the 8c, for 10d9s6d8c, leaving a one liner to a straight. This is what Phil Galfond might call a false scare card. A level one thinker sees the board and will be frightened. What do I beat now? However, he hasn’t thought through what is calling- or how the sequence of actions changed his current holdings.

If Skors has the Qd, the QdJd is not possible, which is a hand that has to continue against the check and raise. In fact, the combinations of QJ are halved. (QQ is the nut best overpair to take this line with because of this factor.) We can use our handreading ability to discount this holding from villain. However, there’s more! If he did have QJo or QJhh, for instance, how did he call the flop? We have played our hand like a diamond draw – and he’d be right, this is how to play AdKd – so if he is calling to realize his equity, he likely has two less outs and reverse implied odds to give him the shivers. Same thing for hands that include sevens.

Now rewind the tape and try on QQ with the Reg™ line. I have a value hand. I like my equity. I bet. A one liner comes in and the board is now terrible for a continuing range versus one bet, a range which has many more sevens and QJ hands. Do I now check? And then what? Turn my hand into a bluff catcher? Cautiously check fold my top 2% hand like a 2/5 expert? Hope he’ll play weakly as well and we can check it down?

Skors AWe can see how a wide overcalling range, inspired by the limps, fills out in this scenario. First off, for the fearful and cautious in the back of the comedy club, the MUBS terror that inhibits putting two bets onto the flop can be eradicated by just looking at how a 15% calling range might look.  Less obviously, it shows how little value there is to betting as part of a three street play there is, as well. (Are there three combos of A10s?) You will never get three streets or even two except from the very best top pair hands, and they can fold, too. Yet look into the yellow warning light area. A wide limp calling range is going to be able to peel away when you bet. The draws comprise more hands than the value you can charge for multiple streets. Those backdoor and gutters have pairs.  When all these hands get or seem to be made, believe me, they will like your bet/bet/get confused plan. Thumbs up!

It’s strange, isn’t it? Looking at this breakdown, I have all the equity but they have all the playability. That’s range advantage in action. Look further at the ace high, the “nothing” category, the overcard category – are they calling your value line? Do you think they might take action when you check and rep Ax or do you think this is the board for A2 to float? If you are lonely and shivering without your value lead, might that comfort you from the one street you would have gotten from Q10?

When I take the bet out/evaluate approach on boards like this, I will have boxed myself in. What’s philosophically interesting is that I have essentially changed my mind from my preflop action, and rewarded them for calling. Yep, I did it to myself and all I have is my fellow group of regs and the forums left to comfort me – bad board for queens, bro, bad beat, what a suck out. Regspeak. I couldn’t help it, I will tell myself, because that’s what a bet does and what a reg does is bet. I could start getting stupid and over pot everything, or become one of those guys who says, well, uh, just shove and solve the problem.

Catterwampastitzel. You can’t sound a fundamentally wrong note and tune it true by turning up the volume. (You can turn down the volume for entirely interesting effect, but that is not for today.) Betting into boards that disadvantage you is a one street poker line; a spread limit, tournament, viciously capped kind of strategy where there is no maneuverability. There’s little future in it beyond novice games, drunk games, or more interestingly, once we get into a true leveling war which is beyond the 5/5 sphere or a short session with some unknown opponents.

Moving along, Villain calls the check/raise. He has a lot of hands that can make the effective nuts here, which would be, for all intents and purposes, diamonds. He has some two pairs. He has A10 specifically, which is a classic bluff catcher – very likely what Villain actually holds here. (Now he has a two street hand with TPTK – that should turn you on a little.) Villain always shoves with 87 on the flop to protect against our perceived set or diamond draw; that’s one hand he does not have at this point. (He can have it later. We know this, we’re going to play well and be masters of gameflow.) Did he call with 107 and friends? Not likely. What seven does he have that can call the check raise?

Look back at the chart. Not many, because we shut out the equity freeroll a direct bet line creates. We were charging what we ought to charge: all tens and big draws. We were never getting three streets from underpairs. We induced a bet from hands that only benefit from position, hands which were never paying us more than a bet anyway, and then we took that position right back from him (I’ll do this part another day). Miraculous.

In other words, we’ve played our hand as perfectly as we could. There’s a pot sized bet left, we’re committed, and we get the money in on the turn. There’s nothing else to do, and we like it. We can’t bet the turn on nearly half the deck when taking the Reg™ line on the flop, but now we are allowed to. Sweet. We have big diamonds, JJ+, sets, and some other stuff like our AdKx blocker hands we boldly continued with. We have some straights and two pairs, because our isolating range ought to have good board coverage.

We don’t care what villain does now, because… he’s screwed. He can’t make a good decision. It’s the exact opposite result of what the bet/bet/fold approach creates, where the in position player always gets to make the best decision and the PFR makes the most mistakes.

There is an objection to what I am saying which is valid: But Persuadeo, this is not good for my games! I don’t need to be balanced, I just need to bet and they pay me! Why get fancy? Sure, bully for you if you are sitting in, and content to sit, in small, soft games. However, I think it would be a pedagogical error for me to encourage this thinking, even if you can get away with it. Just betting your equity and reevaluating on every street is 1/2 poker. To get better, which is the end many of us dwell on forums and in poker literature for, you have to look ahead and struggle with what is difficult and what is coming next, whether it’s the runout or a concept itself.

Now, the point of the OP’s post was in fact centered on the conversation among the regs. In fact, it sounds like the hand history would never have posted without the grumbling disputation of how Skors played. This is, I think, a great moment which underlines a lot of what I am saying. We want them confused. We want them not understanding. We want them in a full Reg™ uproar. How else are we going to beat a game that is all about reciprocity and all situations are inevitably repeated? We don’t want to play like them, and we don’t want them to play like us. Skors may have gotten a little lost in his reasoning about facing a flop three bet, but that’s fine. In a game where most players can’t even get preflop right, playing the flop in a sophisticated manner means he is miles ahead, and can look forward to a profitable poker future.

So let them babble. Let them quit at paragraph x. Let the games be good. Let them gossip and chortle. All that really needs to be said at the end is…

Nice hand.


Note: Poker Dad was grumpy when I called and asked him for this week’s piece, calling me a “blowhard” and complaining that “posting once a week is like slavery.” Hopefully he’ll be back next Sunday, better rested and feeling more like himself. – P.


  1. Thank you for this really in depth and interesting post. I plan on coming back and reading this quite a few more time.

  2. yeah, I met up with him once and have seen his videos. Separating the cards like that always made me laugh.

Leave a Reply

The OOP Lexicon is a user-developed poker glossary.

Absolute Position
Being last to act (e.g. closest to the button) postflop.

Advancing Leverage
Aggressive actions intended to shift the leverage point closer to the current street.

A bluff or value hand which is a natural candidate for balancing another hand because of their shared qualities, such as AA and AK; usually helps planning range splitting and line construction.

Auto profit threshold (APT)
A bluff made with positive expectation resulting from the opponent under defending vis-a-vis bet sizing. The inverse of MDF.

Choosing to support either value bets or bluffs with their converse.

A bet is a proposition.  It’s the first offer on the pot with regard to the outcome of the game. Each player, in turn, has the opportunity to lay or change the price on the pot to the rest of the players. “The language of poker.” The bet, as opposed to the raise, is most often and most easily allied to the merged pricing construction.

To remove combinations of hands from a range based on cards in your hand or on the board.

Cards which influence our combinatorial assumptions. Ex: We face resistance on T76ss while we hold As7d. Both our cards act as blockers. Our ace of spades blocks (limits) a number of flush draws our opponent could hold, while our seven blocks a number of two pair and sets our opponent could hold. *See also Block and Unblock

Blocker Bet
A small bet made by an out-of-position player.

Board Texture
The available community cards and the set of conditions which inform its relationship to a logical range.

The worst hands in a betting range.  Depending on context this could be the worst hand in a value bet range or the bluffing section of polarized range.

A range descriptor indicating a range shape with a specific high or low boundary.  A range bounded high won't contain some number of the best linear hands ranked from the top down.  This is equivalent to a "capped" range.  A range bounded low won't contain some number of the worst linear hands ranked from the bottom up.  This is often useful to describe a range that doesn't include any air or very weak hands.

A strategic mode in which a player is attempting to deny their opponent(s) equity share of the pot through aggression. Often referred to as “denying equity” or “buying up equity”.

A range is capped when it represents little to no nutted combinations as confirmed by prior action.

A continuation bet. A bet made by the player with initiative as a continuation of their initiative on a prior street.

The ability to accurately range an opponent based on all available information at a decision point.  An understanding of your hands exact equity.

Closing Action
Acting last where no subsequent action is possible behind you.  For example calling a UTG raise in the BB or calling in position postflop with no players behind.

Cold Call/Cold Bet
An action is considered “cold” when it comes from a player entering into the pot has not previously put chips voluntarily in the pot. Ex: the UTG opens, the BTN 3bets. If the SB were to call or raise, it would be a cold-call or a cold-4bet.

The branch of mathematics the deals with finite number sets. Used in poker in determining the amount of combinations of certain hands in a range.

When a blind that is not the biggest blind calls the amount of the biggest blind. Ex: At $2/$5, action folds around to the SB and the SB completes. Meaning they just call. The BB can complete when there is a straddle.

A capped range that contains only middling value hands. A range without the polarized portion.

Logical advancement of combinations across streets.

Dark Side of the Deck
The large swath of hands, often off-suit, that fall outside of conventional playable recommendations. Counter-equity hands.

Dead Money
Money in the pot that is not being fought for.  A passive player creates dead money when they call a bet preflop and looking to play fit-or-fold postflop. Dead Money is often confused with the money in the pot.

Delayed Cbet
A cbet made on the turn by the preflop raiser when the flop checked through.

Delaying Leverage
Passive actions intended to maintain a likely late street leverage point, or possibly to avoid a leverage point entirely.

A strategic break from one’s standard construction as an exploit of a particular player’s profile or construction.

Diminishing Medium Value Category
A Seidman concept in which when one’s middling value hand range is too small and transparent to our opponent and thus either that range should be shifted into the top of a polarized range or the nutted portion should be shifted into the medium value range. Ex: AQo or TT being 3bet preflop.

A cbet that is less than the preflop raise. Ex: BTN opens to $25, we 3bet to $90 from the SB, BTN calls. On the flop we cbet $70.

Dry Board
A board texture that yields relatively few logical hands value. Often containing one medium or high card and disconnected low cards. Ex: Q53r, T622r.

Dual Mentalities
A Seidman concept in which when we decide to go postflop with a weak hand against a nutted range, we should either be looking to out flop it or steal the pot away. We base our decision against the player type we are up against and never go post with both mentalities at once.

Dynamic Board
A flop texture in which the runout is very likely to change the order of top ranking hands. Ex: 954tt, 742r.

Effective Stack
The smallest stack to VPIP in a given hand. Their stack decides the amount of money that can be played for or threatened before an all-in.

Effective nuts
A value hand that can be played for stacks as if it were the actual nuts.  This is a relative hand ranking based on range assumptions and opponent type.

A measure of how well the equity of a hand is deployed. Efficiency can also be used as a measure of what is risked vs what is gained for a given bet size.

Either/Or Philosophy
A Seidman concept in which a particular street can be a very good spot for value, meaning our opponent is never folding, or a very good spot to bluff, meaning our opponent is never calling, but that those spots cannot be concurrent.

Borrowed from economics, a measure of the sensitivity of a range or hand relative to the price offered.  Ranges (or hands) described as elastic will narrow, sometimes quickly, in response to increases in price.  Those described as inelastic will not.

The percent pot share of a holding or range on any given street if the hand were to go to showdown with no further betting action.

Equity Pusher
A analytic approach to the game in which a player views the correct actions only through the lens of their hands equity vs. their opponent’s range. Often this player type has a lack of understanding of overall strategy and plays their range face up with few bluffs.

Expected Value
The mathematical formula for how much a player’s action is expected to make with their hand vs. their opponent’s range. EV = ($towin * %ofwin) - ($tolose * %ofloss)

Face Up
A player is playing their range “face up” when their actions directly correspond with their desired outcome. Ex: A player bets half-pot three streets with a range that has no bluffs. A player 3bets to 7x with JJ.

False Polarization
Otherwise known as Faux-Po; a polarizing action taken with a merged range.

The result of losing your entire table stakes. All the way down to the felt.

A call of a cbet with a weak holding with the likely intention of taking the pot away when the opponent shuts down. Often done by an in position preflop caller.

The convergence of positions, stack depths, and preceding actions at a given decision point.

A mathematical formula developed by Phil Galfond for calculating the expected value of one’s range construction vs. an opponent’s holding.

A computer programming term that means "garbage in, garbage out" which also applies to poker forums when a poster seeks an in-depth conversation about a hand, but fail to provide pertinent information such as stack sizes, bets sizes, table dynamics and player tendencies.

Game Theory
The applied science of combining mathematical models with logic to craft winning poker strategies.

Game Theory Optimal
A set of strategies is GTO if no player can unilaterally deviate and increase his average profit. ~ Will Tipton.  GTO does not mean best possible response, highest EV, or maximally exploitative play.

Implied Odds
Additional value likely to be accrued if you make your hand on a later street.

Sometimes referred to as the betting lead, a common situation in which the passive player yields to the aggressive player postflop, or the last aggressor continues betting on subsequent streets.

A bet or raise intended to force out the rest of the field in order to play heads up against a weaker opponent who has entered the pot through limping, raising, or posting the blinds.

Loose aggressive player type. Generally overused and inaccurate.

A bet made from out of position after a passive action. Often referred to as a donk bet on the flop.

He knows that I know that he knows I know.

A bet or raise that signals the hand will be played for stacks.  Within reason, it is accomplished by betting with a sizing that will create RSP equal to 1 on the following street.

Limp First In

A consecutive range of hands decreasing in strength from top to bottom; generally meaning value hands. Equivalent to "merged."

Lockdown Board
A board on which the nuts have often already been made.  More prevalent in PLO but sometimes useful in no-limit, for example on monotone flops and boards with available common straights e.g. JT9, T98, 987, etc.

1) A range of hands that includes both strong and medium value; 2) in reference to medium value; 3) the merged construction describes the natural representation of a wide range through a bet.

Mini Stop-N-Go
A Seidman concept, a line taken by a OOP PFR where flop is check/called and turn is lead.

Minimum Defense Frequency (MDF)
The necessary defending (calling/raising) frequency to prevent an opponent from auto-profiting.  The inverse of APT.

Natural Action
A check, bet, or raise which is exactly suited to a player's range and situation (e.g. a pfr's continuation bet on AK2r).

A player who will not put chips into the pot without a very strong and sometimes only nutted hand.

The best possible hand.

Nuts-To-Air Ratio (NAR)
In a polarized betting line, the ratio of value to bluff.  As used by Seidman, not limited to polarization but sometimes used to label general opponent tendency of value to bluff.

Old Man Coffee. Typically an older, retired player that likes to play bingo with ATC, but will only continue with the nuts.

The first voluntary action. The first action or bet to voluntarily enter the pot.

A bet that is more than the size of the pot.

Perceived Range
Refers to the range of hands that your opponent thinks you could have in a certain playing situation. This can be interpreted and thus misinterpreted from your playing style and position at the table.

A range consisting of very strong and very weak hands.

Post Oak Bluff
A small bluff on a late street that has little chance of winning the pot.  Generally interpreted as “gutless” in the past but now fulfilling certain functions as betting efficiencies are understood.

Positional Protection
When the strength of a range is perceived to be capped or uncapped based on which position an action is taken from.

When an action or player is perceived to have strong hands in its range.

Protection Bet
A wager which denies equity to hands which will only give action if they significantly improve; "a value bet which does not want a call."

The rejection of the offered price and the laying of a new higher price.  Raises represent a more narrow range of hands and trend towards polarization.

Range Advantage
Implementation or study tool that refers to 1) most basically, equity measurement of one range against another; 2) or also including a combination of further factors including availability of nutted hands, the nuances of the runout, and positional protection.

Range Manipulation
Deliberate line work/bet sizing made to narrow a range or keep a range wide.

Range Switch
A deliberate change in range composition made to thwart a player who is reading our range too accurately in any spot.  Reduces transparency, fights assumptions, and wins the leveling war if implemented correctly.

Ratio of Stack To Pot
RSP. The stack to pot ratio at any point in a hand, generally used post-flop as opposed to Stack to Pot Ratio.

Taking a hand to showdown and realizing its full equity.  Generally used with regard to passive actions.

The mutual exchange of chips resulting from similar play and ideas.  Reciprocity is a common bi-product of group-think.  A true edge by definition cannot be reciprocal.

Relative Position
A player’s position measured against the aggressor's position.  Generally this is used going to the flop.  For example, if UTG raises and several players call behind, calling in the big blind would give you the best relative position.  You will act after seeing how the field responds to a likely continuation from the preflop aggressor.  In the same scenario calling immediately after the preflop aggressor results in the worst relative position.  You will have to act immediately after a continuation without seeing how the remaining players will respond.  Strong relative position confers an information edge.

The ability of hand to maintain equity across streets against a betting range or as part of a betting range.

Reverse Implied Odds (RIO)
Hands that often win small pots or lose large pots suffer from reverse implied odds.

Popularized by Mathew Janda, a descriptor for how well a hand retains equity over streets of play.  Hands described as robust have equity that does not suffer as an opponent's range becomes stronger.  Often these hands are currently both strong and invulnerable, or have the ability to become very strong by the river, relative to the opponent's range.

Fourth and Fifth Street cards following a given flop texture.

Scale of Protection
Poker theorem which states that the more protected or strong an opponent's range is, the higher the degree of denial or retention a counter will require.

Sklansky Bucks
Dollars won (or lost) in expected value regardless of actual hand result.

Any one of many possible poker archetypes found at low stakes games.

A reraise made after a player has raised and one or more players has called in-between.

Static Board
A flop texture in which the runout is unlikely to change the order of top ranking hands. Ex: AK7r, KK4r.

A passive action followed by an aggressive action, out of position.  For example, a call followed by a lead on the next street.

Streets of Value
A crude shorthand measurement for how much betting a hand can tolerate and still be best at showdown more often than not.

Tight aggressive opponent type. Generally overused and misapplied.

TAG's Dilemma
The paradox created by having a top-heavy range played so aggressively that it misuses equity vis-à-vis position and holding.

The Great Range Fantasy
The common idea that we know our opponent’s range and frequencies precisely; most commonly seen in post-hoc analysis to justify microedge decisions.

Thin Value
A bet that is only slightly more likely to be called by worse than by better. Associated with the merged pricing construction and bet-fold lines.

Three Fundamentals
The most fundamental variables for decision making: position, stack size, and community cards.

The best hands in a given range.

Two-Way Bet
A bet that expects calls from worse hands and incorrect folds at the same time, a simultaneous value bet and bluff line.

The psychological effect of feeling like you’re losing because your stack size isn’t as large as it once was during a session, even though it’s more than what you’re in the game for.

(e.g. You bought in for $100, ran it up $450, but now only have $175 in front of you.)

A hand that has no negative card removal effects on the target range.  Bottom set, for example, unblocks top pair top kicker.

A range that is perceived to contain the nuts in any given line.  Capped ranges may become uncapped during transitions for example from preflop to flop, or flop to turn.

A turned nut straight after raising flop with a gutter.

Value Owning
Making value bets with a hand that has less than 50% equity when called.

Voluntarily Put Money In Pot (VPIP)
The frequency at which a player limps, calls, or raises preflop.

Volatile Board
A flop texture where equities will often shift on the turn and river.  See “dynamic”.

An illusory cooler where one player makes a massive mistake equity mistake and loses his stack with a strong but second best hand; also known as a Jam Basket.

Wet Board
A board texture that allows for a lot of logical hands to continue. Often made up of medium rank connected cards. Ex: KT9tt, Tc8c6s-7c-Ac.

“Walk In, Fuck Shit Up, Walk Out” a hashtag used by instagram poker players.

Winning Player
A forum poster who offers reciprocal advice under the guise of questionable positive low stakes results. A weak player or fish, in general.

Young Man Coffee. Is very much an OMC, but younger.  They usually only continue with the nuts, often under the illusion of playing a GTO style.